A Sophisticated Social Welfare Function (SSWF) is a mapping from pro…les of individual preferences into a sophisticated preference which is a pairwise weighted comparison of alternatives. We characterize Pareto optimal and pairwise independent SSWFs in terms of oligarchies that are induced by some power distribution in the society. This is a fairly large class ranging from dictatoriality to anonymous aggregation rules. Our results generalize the impossibility theorem of Arrow (1951) and the oligarchy theorem of Gibbard (1969) .
Introduction
It is possible to have a more general perspective of the preference aggregation problem by incorporating elements of ambiguity into individual and/or social preferences. As there are various ways of conceiving ambiguity, there are also various ways of generalizing the aggregation model of Arrow (1951) through ambiguous preferences.
Two major strands of the literature emerge: One of these models a preference as a fuzzy binary relation and the other has a probabilistic conception of preferences. Our analysis belongs to the latter strand. 1 We introduce the concept of a sophisticated preference which is a weighted pairwise comparison of alternatives that allows some kind of a mixed feeling in comparing any given pair of alternatives. To be more concrete, suppose an individual is asked whether she likes Paris or Istanbul. A sophisticated preference allows an answer of the following type: "I like Paris more than Istanbul in some respect but I like Istanbul more than Paris in other respects". The answer is also required to quantify the "rate"at which Istanbul is better than Paris and vice versa. Moreover, these are normalized rates which add up to unity. In other words, a sophisticated preference assigns to each ordered pair (x; y) of alternatives some (x; y) belonging to the interval [0; 1] such that (x; y) + (y; x) = 1. 2 Sophisticated preferences generalize the standard notion of a preference when (x; y) = 1 is interpreted as x being preferred to y in its usual sense.
We consider sophisticated social welfare functions (SSWFs) which aggregate vectors of (non-sophisticated) preferences into a sophisticated preference. We propose two intepretations of our model. One of these is from a social choice perspective which aims to represent the existing preferences in a society. Here, a vector of preferences is seen as the list of preferences that di¤erent individuals of the society have. These are aggregated into a sophisticated preference which is a representation of the various opinions prevailing in the society. Our second interpretation is from an individual choice perspective where a vector of preferences contains various rankings of alternatives by one given individual, according to various criteria. For example, a new Ph.D. graduate in the job market may rank universities according to di¤erent criteria such as their location, their salaries etc. Each of these criteria may result in a di¤erent ranking from which the individual has to derive an overall preference with possibly mixed feelings.
Given these interpretations, we require a certain consistency of the aggregated outcome, expressed by some transitivity condition imposed over sophisticated preferences 3 : We qualify a sophisticated preference as transitive whenever given any three alternatives x; y and z, we have (x; y) = 1 =) (x; z) (y; z). In other words, if x is preferred to y in all respects and r is the "rate" at which y is preferred to z, then the "rate" at which x is preferred to z is at least r. As we will discuss in details, this is a relatively weak transitivity condition whose non-sophisticated counterpart is equivalent to quasi-transitivity. 4 However, given our interpretations of the model, it seems the most appropriate and we do not wish to strengthen it so that its re ‡ection over non-sophisticated preferences becomes equivalent to the usual transitivity condition. 5 Our setting is closely related to the collective probabilistic judgement model of Barberà and Valenciano (1983) . In fact, their collective probabilistic judgement functions being more general than our SSWFs, their results can be imported to our environment. On the other hand, as further discussed in in Section 4, we present a strong result which does not follow from Barberà and Valenciano (1983) : We give a full characterization of Pareto optimal and pairwise independent SSWFs in terms of oligarchies induced by some power distribution in the society. As an oligarchy is any non-empty subsociety whose members share the decision power, this is a fairly large class ranging from dictatoriality (where the oligarchy consists of a single individual) to anonymous SSWFs (where decision power is equally distributed among individuals). In fact, our characterization generalizes two major results of the literature: In case the ranges of Pareto optimal and pairwise independent SSWFs are restricted to non-sophisticated preferences, the oligarchies must contain precisely one individual (thus a dictator) -which is the impossibility theorem of Arrow (1951 Arrow ( , 1963 . In case the social outcome is restricted to complete and quasitransitive (non-sophisticated) preferences, Pareto optimal and pairwise independent SSWFs are oligarchical in the sense that the oligarchy has full decision power while all proper subsets of the oligarchy have 3 The literature on ambiguous preferences admits a range of transitivity conditions of varying strenght, a list of which can be found in Dubois and Prade (1980) or Dasgupta and Deb (1996) . 4 Quasi-transitivity of a non-sophisticated preference requires x being better than z, whenever x is better than y and y is better than z. This is weaker than the usual transitivity requirement of x being at least as good as z, whenever x is at least as good as y and y is at least as good as z.
5 Nevertheless, we discuss, at the end of Section 3, how such strenghtenings a¤ect our results. equal decision power -a result which is known as the oligarchy theorem of Gibbard (1969) .
Section 2 introduces the basic notions. Section 3 states the results. Section 4 makes some concluding remarks. The proof of Theorem 3.1 is given in Appendix A.
Basic Notions
We consider a …nite set of individuals N with #N 2, confronting a …nite set of alternatives A with #A 3. A sophisticated preference is a mapping : A A ! [0; 1] such that for all distinct x; y 2 A we have (x; y) + (y; x) = 1 while (x; x) = 0 8 x 2 A. Interpreting (x; y) as the weight by which x is preferred to y, the former condition imposes a kind of completeness over while the latter is an irre ‡exivity requirement. 6 We qualify a sophisticated preference as transitive i¤ (x; y) = 1 =) (x; z) (y; z) 8 x; y; z 2 A. 7 We write for the set of transitive sophisticated preferences. Let = f 2
: (x; y) 2 f0; 1g for all x; y 2 Ag be the set of sophisticated preferences which map A A into the f0; 1g doubleton. Note that by interpreting (x; y) = 1 as x being preferred to y in its usual meaning and writing x y whenever (x; y) = 1, becomes the set of connected, irre ‡exive, transitive and asymmetric (non-sophisticated) preferences over A. 8 We assume that individual preferences belong to and we write i 2 for the preference of i 2 N over A. A preference pro…le over A is an n-tuple = ( 1 ; :::; #N ) 2 N of individual preferences. A Sophisticated Social Welfare Function (SSWF) is a mapping : N ! . So ( ) 2 is a sophisticated preference over A which, by a slight abuse of notation, we denote . Thus (x; y) 2 [0; 1] stands for the weight that assigns to (x; y) 2 A A at 2 N . Given any distinct x; y 2 A, let (x; y) = f 2 : x yg be the set of preferences where x is preferred to y. A SSWF : N ! is Pareto Optimal (PO) i¤ given any distinct x; y 2 A and any 2 N where i 2 (x; y) for all i 2 N , we have (x; y) = 1. A SSWF : N ! is 6 Letting (x; x) = 0 is conventional. All our results can be proven by taking (x; x) = 1 or (x; x) = 1 2 . 7 Remark that (y; z) = 1 =) (x; z) (x; y) would be an equivalent statement of transitivity. Moreover, transitivity implies (x; y) = (y; z) = 1 =) (x; z) = 1. It is also worth noting that Condition 1 (Consistency under Complete Rejection) of Barberà and Valenciano (1983) , adapted to our framework, is equivalent to transitivity 8 In other words, for any 2 and any distinct x; y 2 A, precisely one of x y and y x holds while x x holds for no x in A. Moreover x y and y z implies x z for all x; y; z 2 A. independent of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) i¤ given any distinct x; y 2 A and any ; 0 2 N with i 2 (x; y) () 0 i 2 (x; y) for all i 2 N , we have (x; y) = 0 (x; y). 9 SSWFs satisfying IIA can, as usual, be expressed in terms of pairwise SSWFs. To see this, take any distinct x; y 2 A and let f x y ; y x g be the set of possible (non-sophisticated) preferences over fx; yg where x y is interpreted as x being preferred to y and y x is y being preferred to x. We denote the set of sophisticated preferences over fx; yg as xy . 10 A pairwise SSWF (de…ned over fx; yg) is a mapping f : f x y ; y x g n ! xy . So at each r 2 f x y ; y x g n , f (r) 2 xy is a sophisticated preference over fx; yg which, by a slight abuse of notation, we denote f r . Given any 2 N and any distinct x; y 2 A, we write xy 2 f x y ; y x g n for the restriction of to fx; yg where for each i 2 N , we have xy i =
x y i¤ x i y. 11 Thus, every SSWF : N ! satisfying IIA can equivalently be expressed in terms of a family of pairwise SSWFs ff xy g indexed over all distinct pairs fx; yg such that given any 2 N and any (distinct) x; y 2 A we have f xy xy (x; y) = (x; y).
Results
We start by showing that a PO and IIA SSWF uses the same pairwise SSWF over all pairs. Given any x; y; z; t 2 A, any f : f x y ; y x g n ! xy and any
Proposition 3.1 Take any PO and IIA SSWF ff xy g : N ! . Given any a; b; c; d 2 A with #fa; b; c; dg 2, we have f ab = f cd . 9 Remark that a social welfare function (SWF) -as de…ned by Arrow (1951) -is a SSWF : N ! whose range is . Moreover, for such SSWFs, the de…nitions of PO and IIA coincide with their original de…nitions made for SWFs. Hence our framework generalizes the Arrovian aggregation model. 10 A sophisticated preference is originally de…ned for a set of alternatives whose cardinality is at least three while it can be easily adapted for doubletons: For every 2 xy , we have (x; y) 2 [0; 1], (x; y) + (y; x) = 1, (x; x) = 0 and (y; y) = 0. Proof. Let ff xy g = be a PO and IIA SSWF. Take any a; b; c; d 2 A with #fa; b; c; dg 2. The equality between f ab and f cd trivially holds when #fa; b; c; dg = 2. To establish f ab = f cd when #fa; b; c; dg = 3, we take any distinct a; b; c 2 A and show that f ab = f ac . To see this, take any
To see f ab r (a; b) = f ac s (a; c), suppose for a contradiction and without loss of generality that f ab 
As and f are equivalent and by the choice of , we have (a; c) = f r (a; c) and
, violating the transitivity of .
We now show that PO and IIA SSWFs fall into a class that we call "oligarchical" SSWFs. We say that a SSWF : N ! is oligarchical i¤ there exists a nonempty coalition O N (to which we refer as the oligarchy) such that for any distinct x; y 2 A and any 2 N , we have (x; y) > 0 () 9 i 2 O such that x i y. 
Theorem 3.1 Every PO and IIA SSWF is oligarchical.
We give the proof of Theorem 3.1 in Appendix A.
Remark that the converse statement of Theorem 3.1 does not hold. For, although an oligarchical SSWF is PO, it need not satisfy IIA. 13 To transform Theorem 3.1 into a full characterization, we need to know more about IIA and oligarchical SSWFs. So we proceed by showing that under IIA and oligarchical SSWFs, the social outcome depends only on the preferences of the oligarchy members. 13 To see this, consider the following Example 1 where N = f1; 2; 3g and A = fa; b; cg. Take any 2 N and any distinct x; y 2 A. If admits a Condorcet winner, i.e., 9 c 2 A such that for each z 2 Anfcg, #fi 2 N : c i zg 2, then let (x; y) = #fi 2 N : x i yg=3. If admits no Condorcet winner, then let (x; y) = 1 2 . One can check that exempli…es a SSWF which is oligarchical but not IIA. of we have ab = ac = r, implying (a; c) = (a; b). Now take some 0 2 N such that 0 i = i 8i 2 O and a 0 i c () a i c 8i 2 N nO. Thus 0 (c; a) = (c; a). As c 0 i b 8i 2 O, by Remark 3.1, we have 0 (c; b) = 1 and the transitivity of 0 implies 0 (c; a) = (c; a) 0 (b; a). Now pick some 00 2 N such that 00
Thus 00 (c; a) = 0 (c; a). As b 00 i c 8i 2 O, by Remark 3.1, we have 00 (b; c) = 1 and the transitivity of 00 implies 00 (b; a) 00 (c; a) = 0 (c; a). Noting 00 (b; a) = 0 (b; a); we establish 0 (b; a) = (c; a) = (b; a), completing the proof. We de…ne a power distribution in the society as a mapping ! : 2 N ! [0; 1] such that !(K)+!(N nK) = 1 for all K 2 2 N . We consider monotonic power distributions which satisfy !(K) !(L) for all K; L 2 2 N with K L while !(N ) = 1. We qualify a monotonic power distribution ! as oligarchical i¤ Proof. Let ! and be as in the statement of the lemma. Take any 2 N and any x; y 2 A. If x and y are not distinct, then (x; x) = 0 holds by the irre ‡exivity of individual preferences and the fact that !(;) = 0. If x; y are distinct, then the de…nition of a power distribution implies (x; y) 2 [0; 1] and (x; y) + (y; x) = 1. So is a sophisticated preference. To see the transitivity of , take any x; y; z 2 A with (x; y) = 1. Let K 1 = fi 2 N : i 2 (x; y) \ (y; z)g, K 2 = fi 2 N : i 2 (x; z) \ (z; y)g, K 3 = fi 2 N : i 2 (z; x) \ (x; y)g, L 1 = fi 2 N : i 2 (y; x) \ (x; z)g, L 2 = fi 2 N : i 2 (y; z) \ (z; x)g and L 3 = fi 2 N : i 2 (z; y) \ (y; x)g. Note that fK 1 ; K 2 ; K 3 ; L 1 ; L 2 ; L 3 g is a partition of N . Moreover, the way ! induces implies (
) and the monotonicity of ! implies (x; z) (y; z), showing the transitivity of . Thus, is a SSWF. Checking that is PO, IIA and oligarchical is left to the reader.
So every oligarchical power distribution ! generates a PO and IIA SSWF where at each 2 N , the weight by which x is socially preferred to y equals to the power of the coalition of individuals who prefer x to y at . 14 A dictatorial SSWF is ! oligarchical with some d 2 N such that !(K) = 1 for all K 2 2 N with d 2 K. Remark that is the range of dictatorial SSWFs which consequently are social welfare functions as de…ned by Arrow (1951) . In fact, dictatorial SSWFs are the only ! oligarchical SSWFs which coincide with this standard Arrovian de-…nition -a matter which we discuss in the proof of Theorem 3.4.
A Gibbard oligarchical SSWF is ! oligarchical with some O 2 2 N nf?g such that !(K) = 1 for all K 2 2 N with O K, !(K) = 1 2 for all K 2 2 N with K \ O 6 = ? but O * K, and !(K) = 0 for all K 2 2 N with K \ O = ?. Remark that in case #O > 1, the range of a Gibbard oligarchical SSWF is Q = f 2 such that : A A ! f0; 1 2 ; 1gg which is indeed the set of connected, irre ‡exive 14 Remark the ! being oligarchical is critical for Lemma 3.1 to hold. To see this let N = f1; 2; 3g and consider the monotonic power distribution !(fig) = 0 8i 2 N and !(K) = 1 8K 2 2 N with #K > 1. Picking some distinct x; y; z 2 A, one can check that fails transitivity at 2 N where 1 2 (x; y) \ (y; z)g, 2 2 (y; z) \ (z; x)g and and quasi-transitive binary relations over A. 15 It is straightforward to check that what we call Gibbard oligarchical SSWFs are oligarchical social welfare functions as de…ned by Gibbard (1969) .
The equal power ! oligarchical SSWF is de…ned by setting !(K) = #K #N for all K 2 2 N .
Remark that the equal power ! oligarchical SSWF as well as the Gibbard oligarchical SSWF where N is set as the oligarchy are anonymous SSWFs. 16 In fact, anonymous ! oligarchical SSWFs can be characterized in terms of the following anonymity condition we impose over power distributions: We say that a power distribution ! : 2 N ! [0; 1] is anonymous i¤ given any K; L 2 2 N with #K = #L we have !(K) = !(L). Proof. The "if"part is left to the reader. To show the "only if"part, let ! be such that !(K) 6 = !(L) for some K; L 2 2 N with #K = #L. Take any distinct x; y 2 A and consider a pro…le 2 N where i 2 (x; y) for all i 2 K and j 2 (y; x) for all j 2 N nK. So (x; y) = !(K). Now take any bijection : N ! N with f (i)g i2K = L. Let 0 = (1) ; :::; (#N ) . So fi 2 N : 0 i 2 (x; y)g = L, thus 0 (x; y) = !(L), contradicting the anonymity of .
Theorem 3.2 and Proposition 3.4 lead to the following corollary:
Theorem 3.3 A SSWF : N ! is PO, IIA and anonymous if and only if is ! oligarchical for some oligarchical and anonymous power distribution !. 17 We now show how our results lead to the impossibility theorem of Arrow (1951 Arrow ( , 1963 and the oligarchy theorem of Gibbard (1969) . We start with the former. In fact, the following theorem is a restatement of the Arrovian impossibility. 15 We say this by interpreting (x; y) = 1 as x being preferred to y and (x; y) = 1 2 as indi¤erence between x and y, both terms carrying their usual meanings. Write x y whenever (x; y) 1 2 and x y whenever (x; y) = 1. In this case, for any 2 Q and any distinct x; y 2 A, we have x y or y x while x x holds for no x in A. Moreover x y and y z implies x z for all x; y; z 2 A. 16 As usual, we say that a SSWF : N ! is anonymous i¤ given any ( 1 ; :::; #N ) 2 N and any bijection : N ! N , we have ( 1 ; :::; #N ) = ( (1) ; :::; (#N ) ). 17 A power distribution is oligarchical and anonymous only if the oligarchy is N . Proof. The "if" part is left to the reader. To show the "only if" part, take any PO and IIA SSWF : N ! . We know by Theorem 3.2 that is ! oligarchical for some oligarchical power distribution !. Let O be the oligarchy that ! induces. Suppose, for a contradiction, that 9 distinct i; j 2 O. Fix distinct x; y 2 A and consider a pro…le 2 N where i 2 (x; y) and j 2 (y; x). By de…nition of a ! oligarchical SSWF, we have (x; y) > 0 and (y; x) > 0, contradicting that the range of is .
The next theorem is a restatement of the oligarchy therorem of Gibbard (1969):
Theorem 3.5 A SSWF
: N ! Q is PO and IIA if and only if is Gibbard oligarchical.
Proof. The "if" part is left to the reader. To show the "only if" part, take any PO and IIA SSWF : N ! Q. We know by Theorem 3.2 that is ! oligarchical for some oligarchical power distribution !. Let O be the oligarchy that ! induces. By the de…nition of an oligarchy, we have !(K) = 1 for all K 2 2 N with O K and !(K) = 0 for all K 2 2 N with K \ O = ?. Now take any K 2 2 N with K \ O 6 = ? but O * K. Fix distinct x; y 2 A and consider a pro…le 2 N where i 2 (x; y) for all i 2 K and j 2 (y; x) for all j 2 N nK. By de…nition of an oligarchy, we have (x; y) > 0 and (y; x) > 0. As the range of is Q, it must be the case that (x; y) = 1 2 and (y; x) = 1 2 , thus leading to !(K) = 1 2 , showing that is Gibbard oligarchical.
We close the section by discussing the e¤ects of strenghtening transitivity. We say that a sophisticated preference is strongly transitive i¤ (x; y) = 1 and (y; z) > 0 =) (x; z) = 1 8 x; y; z 2 A. We write for the set of strongly transitive sophisticated preferences. The positive result announced by Theorem 3.2 vanishes under this strenghtening. Proof. The "if" part is left to the reader. To show the "only if" part, take any PO and IIA SSWF : N ! . We know by Theorem 3.2 that is ! oligarchical for some oligarchical power distribution !. Let O be the oligarchy that ! induces. Suppose, for a contradiction, that 9 distinct i; j 2 O. Fix distinct x; y; z 2 A and consider a pro…le 2 N where i 2 (x; y) \ (y; z), j 2 (z; x) \ (x; y) and k 2 (x; y) for all k 2 Onfi; jg. By de…nition of an oligarchy, we (x; y) = 1, (y; z) > 0 and (z; x) > 0, thus (x; z) 6 = 1, contradicting that the range of is .
Remark that Q = f 2 such that : A A ! f0; 1 2 ; 1gg is indeed the set of connected, irre ‡exive and transitive (non-sophisticated) preferences over A. In other words, strong transitivity of sophisticated preferences is re ‡ected to non-sophisticated preferences as the standard transitivity condition. On the other hand, we must not be tempted to think that the positive result announced by Theorem 3.2 is merely due to the use of a relatively weaker transitivity. For, there exists other strenghtenings of transitivity which are again re ‡ected to non-sophisticated preferences as transitivity while they still allow for non-dictatorial SSWFs. As a case in point, consider the following condition T to be imposed over sophisticated preferences: (x; y) = (y; z) = 1 2 =) (x; z) = 1 2 8 x; y; z 2 A. Let = f 2 : satis…es T g be the set of transitive sophisticated preferences that satisfy T . In spite of the fact that and are not subsets of each other, we have Q = f 2 such that : A A ! f0; 1 2 ; 1gg which is also the set of connected, irre ‡exive and transitive binary relations over A. Nevertheless, the positive result announced by Theorem 3.2 essentialy prevails over , as the following theorem states:
Theorem 3.7 A SSWF : N ! is PO and IIA if and only if is ! oligarchical for some oligarchical power distribution ! with !(K) 6 = 1 2 8K 2 2 N .
Proof. To see the "if" part, take any oligarchical power distribution ! with !(K) 6 = 1 2 8K 2 2 N . We know by Theorem 3.2 that ! induces an ! oligarchical SSWF : N ! . Moreover, as !(K) 6 = 1 2 8K 2 2 N , trivially satis…es condition T at each 2 N , thus restricting the range of to . To see the "only if", take any PO and IIA SSWF : N ! . By Theorem 3.2, is ! oligarchical for some oligarchical power distribution !. Suppose !(K) = 1 2 for some K 2 2 N . Fix distinct x; y; z 2 A and consider a pro…le 2 N where i 2 (x; y) \ (y; z) for all i 2 K and i 2 (z; x) \ (x; y) for all i 2 N nK. As is induced by ! and !(K) = 1 2 , we have (x; z) = 1 2 and (y; z) = 1 2 while (x; y) = 1 by PO, thus contradicting that is the range of .
Concluding Remarks
We show that the class of Pareto optimal and IIA SSWFs coincides with the family of weighted oligarchies, with dictatorial rules at one end and anonymous rules at the other. Thus, it is possible to aggregate pro…les of rankings into a sophisticated preference by distributing power equally in the society. Whether this is desirable or not is another matter which depends on the interpretation of the model. Anonymity is certainly defendable under the social choice interpretation where preferences of distinct individuals are aggregated into a social preference. On the other hand, viewing the model as in individual decision making problem where an individual aggregates vectors of rankings according to various criteria into an overall preference, it may make sense to propose an unequal power distribution among criteria. 18 In any case, our …ndings announce the possibility of designing anonymous aggregation rules while staying within the class Pareto optimal and IIA aggregation rules. 19 This is in contrast to the generally negative …ndings on aggregating fuzzy preferences, such as Barrett et al. (1986) , Dutta (1987) and Banerjee (1994) who establish various fuzzy counterparts of the Arrovian impossibility. In particular Banerjee (1994) shows that aggregation rules that map non-fuzzy preferences into a fuzzy preference admit a dictator whose power depends on the strenght of the transitivity condition. Although our positive results are also a¤ected by the choice of the transitivity condition, they do not merely depend on this. As discussed at the end of Section 3, we owe our permissive …ndings to the ambiguity that the social preference is allowed to exhibit combined with the relatively weak transitivity condition we use. 20 Our model not only generalizes the framework and results of Arrow (1951) and Gibbard (1969) but also the probabilistic social welfare functions (PSWFs) of Barberà and Sonnenschein (1978) which assign a probability distribution over (non-sophisticated) preferences to each pro…le of (non-sophisticated) preferences. As every probability distribution over nonsophisticated preferences induces a sophisticated preference but the converse is not true, SSWFs are more general objects than PSWFs. As a result, with the natural adaptation of the de…nitions, the fact that every PO and IIA PSWF is ! oligarchical follows from our Theorem 3.2. 21 18 such as a job market candidate who may weigh the salary more than the location of the university. 19 Whether this possibility prevails when individual preferences are also allowed to be sophisticated is an open question to pursue. 20 In the introduction, we discuss the appropriateness of our transitivity condition to our interpretations of the model. 21 while concluding that every ! oligarchical PSWF is PO and IIA requires a On the other hand, the literature admits an environment which is more general than ours: SSWFs are generalized by the probabilistic collective judgement model of Barberà and Valenciano (1983) . In fact, all of their results on probabilistic collective judgement functions can be restricted to our framework so as to be stated for SSWFs. Nevertheless our central result -Theorem 3.2-cannot be deduced from Barberà and Valenciano (1983) . Moreover, when Theorems 1 and 4 of Barberà and Valenciano (1983) are restricted to our framework, they are implied by our Theorem 3.2. Thus, comparing our …ndings with those of Barberà and Valenciano (1983) , we can pretend to have established a stronger result in a narrower environment.
We close by noting the lack of obvious connection between a sophisticated preference and the choice it induces. While this imposes a barrier in using our positive …ndings in resolving social choice problems, it also gives an incentive to propose a rational choice theory with sophisticated preferences.
5 Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 3.1 Theorem 3.1
Every PO and IIA SSWF is oligarchical. Take any SSWF : N ! which satis…es PO and IIA. We say that a coalition K N is decisive for x 2 A over y 2 Anfxg if and only if at some 2 N with i 2 (x; y) for all i 2 K and i 2 (y; x) for all i 2 N nK, we have (x; y) > 0. 22
Lemma 5.1 If K N is decisive for some a 2 A over some b 2 Anfag, then given any distinct x; y 2 A, K is decisive for x 2 A over y:
Proof. Let K N be decisive for some a 2 A over some b 2 Anfag.
Claim 1: Given any x 2 Anfa; bg, K is decisive for a over x. To show the claim, take any x 2 Anfa; bg. Consider a pro…le 2 N where i 2 (a; b) \ (b; x) for all i 2 K and i 2 (b; x) \ (x; a) for all i 2 N nK. As K is decisive for a over b, we have (a; b) > 0. By PO, we have (b; x) = 1. Suppose (x; a) = 1. The transitivity of implies (b; a) = 1, contradicting (a; b) > 0. Thus, (x; a) < 1, which means (a; x) > 0, showing that K is decisive for a over x as well. Claim 2: Given any x 2 Anfa; bg, K is decisive for x over b. To show the claim, take any x 2 Anfa; bg. Consider a pro…le 2 N where i 2 (sub)additivity condition imposed over the power distribution. (see Barberà and Sonnenschein (1978) , McLennan (1980 ), Bandyopadhyay et al. (1982 and Nandeibam (2003) ) 22 As satis…es IIA, the de…nition can be equivalently stated for all 2 N .
